We have prepared an extensive review of EU documents to show just how deep-rooted is the ideology of supra-nationalism and how deceitful are the processes leading inexorably to its achievement.
We are concerned that too few people are aware of just how rigid the EU project is and of the risks that the UK takes while a member, and indeed while it tries to negotiate a satisfactory exit.
Our long article, extracting quotes from ten EU documents, goes back to the Five Presidents’ Report from 2015. We have then selected several sets of these quotations on different themes. This post focuses on the EU’s expectation that the CJEU (otherwise ECJ) will continue to oversee significant aspects of Britain’s future. Others in the forthcoming series provide evidence on Democracy, Propaganda, Ideology Deceit and Lies. These will appear over the next few weeks.
For the EU documents cited in this post see the Appendix below the text. For the full paper, find it here: https://eurout.net/sources-of-evidence/
[A] “The Withdrawal Agreement should respect the Union’s autonomy and its legal order, including the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereafter ‘Court of Justice’) as regards in particular the interpretation and application of Union law.”
This is the opening paragraph. In case there is any doubt that “respect” means ‘obey’, here is the closing paragraph of the position paper:
“The Withdrawal Agreement should provide that where one party considers that the other party has not taken the necessary steps to comply with a ruling of the Court of Justice, the complaining party may seize the Court to request a lump sum or a penalty payment or the suspension of certain parts of the Withdrawal Agreements other than citizens’ rights in order to ensure compliance with the ruling, after giving the other party the opportunity to express its position.”
This puts beyond doubt that the EU’s position – which we interpret to mean ‘mandate’ rather than negotiating position – is that the UK will remain under the jurisdiction of the ECJ for the foreseeable future, and be subject to its rulings and its penalties. The purpose of the ECJ is to protect the EU; this is not international law in any neutral, mutually-beneficial sense.
We may assume that the intention is to continue to restrict the UK’s room for independent action. The motive behind this is not spelt out but we can be sure that it is a poisonous mix of ‘pour encourager les autres’ and protection of the EU against competition, consistent with its protectionist regime.
[B] “The Agreement should ensure the necessary protection of the Union’s interests in the United Kingdom.”
The EU expects to exercise its power to form any withdrawal agreement. It will, of course, do this in its own interests, as the Commission sees those.
“The Agreement should contain provisions relating to the overall governance of the Agreement. Such provisions must include effective enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms that fully respect the autonomy of the Union and of its legal order, including the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union…”
“As soon as the European Council decides that sufficient progress has been achieved to allow negotiations to proceed to the second phase, there will be new sets of negotiating directives. … Should a time-limited prolongation of Union acquis be considered, this would require existing Union regulatory, budgetary, supervisory, judiciary and enforcement instruments and structures to apply.”
The ECJ rules, and will continue to rule through any transition period that may be agreed.
“The Agreement should therefore contain:
“Transitional rules to ensure control by the Commission (or, where applicable, another body responsible under Union law before the withdrawal date), the European Parliament, the Court of Auditors, OLAF and the power to adjudicate of the Court of Justice of the European Union for past payments/recovery orders to United Kingdom beneficiaries and any payments made to United Kingdom beneficiaries after the withdrawal date to honour all legal commitments (including possible loans) authorised by the responsible entity before the withdrawal date.”
If you still thought there may be room for manoeuvre, this nails it down.
“Regarding judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters between the United Kingdom and the EU27, the Agreement should ensure that the recognition and enforcement of national judicial decisions handed down before the withdrawal date remain governed by the relevant provisions of Union law applicable before the withdrawal date. The Agreement should also ensure the continued application of the rules of Union law relating to choices of forum and choices of law made before the withdrawal date.”
This strongly suggests that the UK will not be able to repeal anything the Union has ever put into its laws or regulations prior to our leaving. Do we feel like Gulliver in Lilliput, tied down every which way?
“The Agreement should provide for arrangements relating to:
- a) “Judicial proceedings pending before the Court of Justice of the European Union on the withdrawal date involving the United Kingdom, United Kingdom natural and/or legal persons (including preliminary references); the Court of Justice should remain competent to adjudicate in these proceedings and its rulings must be binding upon the United Kingdom;
- d) “Continued enforceability of Union acts that impose pecuniary obligations and of judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union, adopted or rendered before the withdrawal date or in the course of ongoing judicial and administrative proceedings.”
Yet more confirmation, if any were needed, that we are expected to remain tied down.
“The Agreement should set up an institutional structure to ensure an effective enforcement of the commitments under the Agreement, bearing in mind the Union’s interest in effectively protecting its autonomy and its legal order, including the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union.”
This confirms, again, that the role of the CJEU is to protect the “autonomy and legal order” of the EU.
“The Agreement should include provisions ensuring the settlement of disputes and the enforcement of the Agreement. In particular, these should cover disputes in relation to the following matters:
- – continued application of Union law;”
We can expect any such disputes to be adjudicated by the CJEU, which will bind the UK into continuing obedience to EU law. The CJEU is an activist court that is charged with interpreting EU law to further the aims of the EU. In other words the judges are not politically independent and do not rely on an impartial reading of the written law; they are in place to determine what the law, Treaties and so on say to meet the EU’s current objectives.
“In these matters, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union (and the supervisory role of the Commission) should be maintained. For the application and interpretation of provisions of the Agreement other than those relating to Union law, an alternative dispute settlement should only be envisaged if it offers equivalent guarantees of independence and impartiality to the Court of Justice of the European Union.”
The first sentence is as clear as it gets. The second implies that the CJEU is independent and impartial but it is neither.
[C] “Negotiations should seek to prevent a legal vacuum once the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom …”
How could anyone argue with this, unless they understand what it implies. In the view of the EU a legal vacuum exists where the CJEU does not have jurisdiction.
[A] Position paper transmitted to EU27 on Governance (28 June 2017)
[B] EU Negotiating directives for Article 50 negotiations (22 May 2017)
[C] Draft guidelines following the United Kingdom’s notification under Article 50 TEU [Treaty on European Union] European Council (Art. 50) (29 April 2017)